On 10 October voters in the Provincial election will be asked whether they wish to support an electoral experiment called MMP (Mixed Member Proportional).

 

It is an experiment not because MMP brings anticipated consequences such as more parties in the assembly and perpetual minority governments. As electors in New Zealand have found, it is an experiment because of unintended results such as voter confusion caused by the greater weight of the ‘party’ vote, the new adversarial rather than consensual style, and the all-to-often breaking of promises to build coalitions.

 

MMP is an electoral system in which electors vote for a party, as well as for a local member of the provincial assembly. Locally elected members would sit in the assembly as is the current practice. What’s different is that the number of votes received by political parties determines how many additional members those parties can appoint to the assembly.

 

Under this ‘two vote’ system, voters’ most important vote is for the party, because the party vote determines the partisan composition of the assembly.

 

Since the proportion of seats in the assembly will more closely follow voters’ party preferences, it is likely that we will be locked into a system of perpetual minority governments.  By one calculation, under MMP Ontario would have not had a majority government for the last seventy years. 

 

While some say that minority governments are more responsive, under MMP they are sometimes unworkable. Italy’s MMP system precipitated chronic crises. Even the President of Israel has publicly wished for a political system that behaved like Canada’s.

 

While our present system can produce both majority and minority governments, it has the tendency to foster majorities through larger parties. While our current parties focus on a particular part of the political spectrum, they can only stay in power by appealing to a relatively broad base.

 

MMP is the opposite.  Any party with a viewpoint that can command support of just 3% of the electorate is virtually assured of a seat in the assembly. Thanks to the minority government status of MMP assemblies, small parties exercise influence far greater than their electoral strength. Many articles in political science have concluded that MMP is first and foremost a means to give disproportionate power to smaller parties.

 

In addition to instability, in the MMP system there are issues of accountability due to the appointment of members directly from political parties. Candidate nomination rules are completely decided by each political party. Participation is by paid membership only. As a result members in the assembly selected by political parties are more accountable to their parties than to electors. Once in the assembly and without a riding to represent, there are questions what party selected members of the assembly are to do other than vote, and who are they to represent.

 

Analyses of those few jurisdictions with MMP give reason for concern, especially with an electorate that does not understand the subtleties of MMP.  By playing on the ignorance that voters have of the relative importance of their two votes and by emphasizing party lists, parties may achieve outcomes far different from the overall intent of the electorate.

 

At least under our current system, on the morning after an election, political certainty returns and the government can start to implement its promises. Not so under MMP.  As to be expected with a handful of smaller parties and no loyalties among them, there is near constant jockeying for influence until the next election. Such fractured politics runs contrary to our successful tradition of inclusive policies. 

 

If our current electoral system had significant problems, then taking risks might be worth achieving something better. 

 

One of the original arguments used for MMP is that it would encourage voting. Statistics do not support the claim. Over the last 130 years, turnout at Ontario provincial elections has held consistently in the 60% to 70% range.  New Zealand, one of the very few countries to move to MMP, has actually had its participation rate drop by over 5% since introducing MMP.

 

Nor has electoral power in our current system been a monopoly. In recent memory all three major provincial parties have had a chance to establish a government. Ever sensitive to platform, opinion and responsibility, government policy moves across the political spectrum. New parties can form and reach credible levels of awareness. Members of the assembly have their first loyalty to constituents, sometimes even defying party leaders. The average elector knows exactly for whom he or she is voting.

 

Our system is understandable, vigourous and robust. It works.

 

Let’s keep it that way.